The Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (FMC Act) Financial derivatives in particular featured high on the agenda as an area in need of reform.
risk. In turn, hedging increases efficiency to support a well-functioning market in milk powder.
20
Speculators seek to profit from exposure to risk by predicting market movements. Where hedgers want to avoid exposure to adverse movements in the price of an underlying to protect their business, speculators do not usually have a direct interest in the underlying and instead wish to take a position in the market as a 'gamble'. 21 Speculation has been criticised as adding unnecessary risk to financial systems and, indeed, excessive leverage generated by banks' speculative use of derivatives severely magnified the losses that caused the GFC.
22
That said, speculation is neither inherently positive nor negative. It is only when speculation is widely used for suboptimal risk-taking that market stability is jeopardised. 23 More commonly, speculators play an important role in providing liquidity to the market and acting as counterparties for hedgers. 24 Speculation can also perform a public good as a means by which to aggregate information through price discovery, such as the use of derivatives in prediction markets.
25

III PREDICTION MARKETS: AN INNOVATIVE USE OF DERIVATIVES
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the value of all derivatives is inextricably tied to an underlying, together with another dynamic ingredient: time. Specifically, time-X in the future. Public interest in the future value of an asset or event is pervasive and not limited to financial markets. In fact, each individual, company and government makes predictions about the future every day to inform their decision-making. The accuracy of the information used to make these predictions is therefore of upmost importance. 26 In pursuit of accuracy, decision-makers regularly consult their experience, defer to experts and poll their peers.
Recent experiments in financial innovation, however, suggest that prediction markets can 20 Cameron, above n 6, at 60. 21 provide a far more efficient and accurate metric of probability -the price signal. 27 This Part illustrates how prediction markets harness financial incentives to produce socially useful predictions which often outperform conventional forecasting tools.
28
Prediction markets are speculative exchanges where individuals trade derivative contracts the values of which depend on uncertain future events. In other words, a contract promises to pay a specified amount if an underlying event occurs, and nothing if it doesn't. 29 The underlying event may theoretically be any occurrence which is clear and easily adjudicated; 30 for example, the event that David Cunliffe departs as leader of the Labour Party in 2014, or New Zealand is elected to the UN Security Council for 2015/16. 31 Traders seek to profit from their speculations about the probability of an underlying event by buying or selling the relevant contracts with other traders. Where a trader believes that the contract is undervalued (i.e. the event is more likely to occur than the price reflects), he or she will buy the contract from other traders with the expectation of receiving a payout when the contract expires. Where a trader believes the contract is overvalued (i.e. the event is less likely to occur than the price reflects), he or she will sell the contract to other traders to profit from what he or she perceives to be their poor judgment. 32 These trades are effected by a continuous double auction mechanism, where buyers submit bids, sellers submit asking prices, and the mechanism executes the trades whenever the two sides of the market reach a mutually agreeable price.
33
The valuable information that a prediction market produces is the price of the traded contract. 34 The contract price is directly proportional to the market's belief about whether the event will occur as traders are either more or less willing to take on the risk that the event 27 Ryan P. Support for the proposition that the information produced by prediction markets is likely to outperform conventional forecasting tools is drawn from the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) and "many minds" arguments, and vindicated by empirical evidence. The EMH asserts that the prices of financial products always incorporate all relevant information.
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This is because investors have a profit incentive to exploit any information not contained in prices and hence will do so as quickly as possible before other investors take advantage of the unassimilated information. According to the EMH, therefore, the current price represents the best estimate about the future prospects of a financial asset.
40
The same market forces are at play in prediction markets. Financial incentives are thought to produce a price-signalled prediction which is more reliable than an individual's stated prediction because, as a self-interested market participant, his or her interest in making a profit weighs against any bias that he or she has. 41 Prediction markets present unique and difficult legal issues because they resemble, but are not equivalent to, two other highly regulated products: derivatives and gambling. The close connection between gambling and derivatives used for speculation is often noted. 66 The distinction may be built on policy rather than definition: "[t]he history of financial regulation… can be roughly summarised as everything being banned as gambling (or usury) until an exception was granted for some newly legitimised higher purpose". 67 Legitimacy of markets -information aggregation to formulate predictions -fits poorly within existing models of regulation. 68 As this paper explains, how iPredict is regulated depends on whether the purpose of the market is considered a legitimate end to be pursued within securities law or mere regulatory arbitrage to circumvent gambling legislation. 69 In New Zealand, regulators have permitted the operation of iPredict to date under the Securities Markets Act 1988 ("SM Act"). The future of iPredict under the FMC Act is uncertain. This Part illustrates how iPredict sits in a legal grey area between securities and gambling legislation, and seeks to find a place for this innovative market.
B SECURITIES MARKETS ACT 1988
iPredict is currently regulated as an authorised futures dealer under the SM Act. This is possible because the Securities Commission and the FMA declared that the contracts traded on iPredict are futures contracts because "they are valued according to a future outcome, with that value being determined at the time of their commencement, and they are settled by payment of money rather than by delivery of any goods". 70 This reasoning, while true, offers little by way of a principled distinction between derivatives and gambling. In fact, the same expression could be used to describe a horse racing bet or lottery ticket. If the distinction between derivatives and gambling is built on policy rather than definition, the declaration suggests that the FMA is prepared to endorse the potential of iPredict to generate socially useful predictions -at least in the context of university research. The declaration permits iPredict to operate until 20 November 2016, at which time iPredict will become subject to either the FMC Act or the Gambling Act 2003.
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C REGULATION UNDER THE GAMBLING ACT 2003
The 
D REGULATION UNDER THE FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT ACT 2013
The FMC Act provides an entirely different regulatory framework than the Gambling Act.
Rather than prohibiting certain products, the FMC Act seeks to promote market efficiency through mandatory disclosure of information by issuers of financial products. Disclosure is thought to promote market efficiency by reducing information asymmetries between investors and those who offer financial products to enable investors to make wiser financial decisions. 79 In particular, regulated disclosure is aimed at preventing fraud, misrepresentation and mispricing of risk. 80 The need to correct information asymmetries, however, will not always outweigh the expense associated with disclosure. Accordingly, offers of financial products require disclosure unless an exclusion in Schedule 1 applies.
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The FMC Act also promotes market efficiency, in particular by encouraging confident participation in the markets, through regulation of specific financial sector participants and financial product markets. The FMC Act creates a licensing regime for specific financial sector participants which is designed to be risk-based and flexible to ensure competency and suitable disclosure. 82 Three of these licenses are discussed below. The FMC Act largely replicates the SM Act with respect to regulation of financial product markets but incorporates new exemptions to tailor the requirements of the FMC Act to smaller "stepping stone" markets. 83 While the FMC Act allows for a great deal of regulatory flexibility, it is unclear whether iPredict will be regulated under the FMC Act and, if so, how iPredict will be regulated. 
Will iPredict be regulated under the FMC Act?
The FMC Act applies to "financial products" which are defined as equity, debt, managed investment products, and derivatives. 84 The legal status of the contracts traded on iPredict is not clarified by the FMC Act, under which a derivative: 85 (4) Means an agreement in relation to which the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) under the agreement, a party to the agreement must, or may be required to, provide at some future time consideration of a particular kind or kinds to another person; and (ii) that future time is not less than the time, prescribed for the purposes of this subparagraph, after the time at which the agreement is entered into; and (iii) the amount of the consideration, or the value of the agreement, is ultimately determined, is derived from, or varies by reference to (wholly or in part) the value or amount of something else (of any nature whatsoever and whether or not deliverable).
The relevant agreements are those between traders on iPredict's online platform. iPredict is the market provider and is not party to the trades. 86 In purchasing a contract on iPredict, In addition to trading, contracts are made available for purchase by traders in two ways: short-selling and bundling. Short-selling is where a trader sells a futures contract at today's price that is not owned by the trader, and the trader will be required to pay for the contract in the future. A trader will short-sell where he or she expects the purchase price to fall. Bundling occurs when a market consists of several contracts each of which have the same payout amount and are mutually exclusive. A trader will purchase bundles to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. Importantly, both short-selling and bundling ensure that bets are fully funded and the market does not make a loss.
The pertinent issue for iPredict is that the definition of derivative appears to exclude agreements where the contract value is derived from an underlying which has no quantifiable "value" or "amount" independent of the contract, such as contracts for National to win the election. This is significant because contracts which do not rely on a value or amount (such as an index or commodity) are by far the most popular of the contracts traded on iPredict.
Their legal status is therefore crucial to the market's liquidity and consequent accuracy.
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Financial products that are not included in the financial product definitions but which fall within a broad definition of "security" may nevertheless be designated by the FMA to be a financial product. 89 In the context of interest rate swap contracts entered into by parties or institutions involved in the capital market and the making or receiving of loans, the normal inference will be that the contracts are not gaming or wagering but are commercial or financial transactions to which the law will, in absence of some other consideration, give full recognition and effect.
That this view is included in the explanatory note rather than the FMC Act itself reflects the opinions of submitters on the FMC Bill that the concept of legitimate financial market transactions will largely be a discretionary matter based on facts and circumstances. This paper proposes that the contracts traded on iPredict should be considered legitimate financial market transactions by virtue of their utility to generate accurate forecasts on issues of public concern. The positive externality of accurate forecasting admittedly is not the traders' purpose, and is remarkably different than the commercial purposes which will usually distinguish legitimate financial market transactions from gambling. 100 However, unlike gambling, prediction markets have potential to improve public and private decision-making, and education and research, which are unquestionably legitimate ends.
In the author's view, innovations which have these positive externalities should be encouraged and the key question for the FMA should be whether the subject of the contracts is a "game" or an important event in which there is legitimate public interest.
The probabilities of many political, economic and social events have significant implications for the public, and would thereby satisfy this legitimate public interest requirement.
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The FMA's decision on this question will be informed by the next stage of the FMA's inquiry: whether declaring that the contracts traded on iPredict are derivatives is necessary or desirable to promote the purposes of the FMC Act. 102 Designation is necessary to promote market innovation in this instance because not to do so would render iPredict illegal under the wide definition of gambling in the Gambling Act. Designation would enable the development of a relatively low-risk market in which consumers can participate and become better informed about how markets operate. Accordingly, this paper recommends that the FMA continues its policy under the SM Act and declares that the contracts traded on iPredict are derivatives under the FMC Act.
If so, how will iPredict be regulated?
The distinctive features of iPredict which ought to guide its regulation are that the market solicits the public to trade, many of whom are retail traders; the market is relatively small; 100 Hahn and Tetlock, above n 69, at 269: In practice, there is no simple way to know a person's motives for trading in a market. Gambling may occur in a large number of markets, including stock markets. Prediction market traders may be motivated by the forecast. See also for discussion about why prediction markets should be regulated at all. 101 Hahn and Tetlock, above n 69, at 274 where the authors' propose a similar "economic purpose test". 102 Financial Markets Conduct Act, s 563.
iPredict holds traders' money; and the traded derivatives are not complex but involve an element of risk. 103 Given the close connection between derivatives and gambling, it is also important that regulation ensures iPredict is limited to offering derivatives with underlyings in which there is legitimate public interest to justify the distinction.
Under the FMC Act, iPredict could be regulated as a licensed derivatives issuer or a financial product market. This Part illustrates how neither of these categories facilitate the development and efficient operation of iPredict. iPredict can operate under the FMC Act only if the FMA grants substantial exemptions from regulatory compliance.
(i) Licensed Market Services Provider: Derivatives Issuer
The category of 'authorised futures dealer' is removed from the FMC Act. Instead, transitional provisions prescribe that authorised futures dealers must be treated as holding a financial services licence, 104 and the majority of futures dealers will be licensed as derivatives issuers.
105
A derivatives issuer is the person who enters into the derivative, provided that person is in the business of entering into derivatives. 106 As this paper explained, iPredict is the market provider and is not party to the trades. The traders enter into the derivatives, but they are not "in the business" of entering into derivatives; most trade recreationally. 107 In effect, there is no derivatives issuer to license. This unusual result is due to the fact that iPredict operates much more like an exchange than a dealer. The SM Act definition of futures dealer permitted the FMA to declare any conduct to be dealing in a futures contract.
of disclosure. iPredict would rely on the FMA granting an exemption from Part 3 disclosure to remain viable.
116
Even if this exemption was granted, the licensing conditions that the FMA may impose on derivatives issuers highlight the unsuitability of the licence for iPredict. Licensing conditions largely reflect the (now revoked) Futures Industry (Client Funds) Regulations 1990 with a focus on maintaining minimum amounts of capital and liquid assets; ensuring the licensee can withstand liquidity shocks; systems for assessing the suitability of a derivative for a retail investor; and limiting the extent to which retail investors can be leveraged under a derivative. 117 For iPredict, the small size of the market, simplicity and low value of the derivatives, and contribution limits make these conditions excessive. The FMA agrees, as iPredict was exempt from compliance with the Futures Industry (Client Funds) Regulations.
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(ii) Financial Product Market iPredict will be regulated as a financial product market if it doesn't hold a market services licence. 119 A financial product market is a facility by means of which offers to acquire or dispose of financial products are made or accepted. 120 This is a more accurate description of how iPredict operates than derivatives issuer. iPredict would be exempt from market licensing requirements because the aggregate value of the derivatives acquired under transactions on the market is less that $2 million per year. 121 Moreover, continuous disclosure, substantial security holder disclosure, and directors' and officers' disclosure would not apply because iPredict does not facilitate offers of listed issuers. 122 The residual market regulation -prohibitions on insider trading and market manipulation -would, however, frustrate the forecasting capability of the market. Insider trading regulations prohibit a person from trading where they have material information about the derivatives or the underlying that is not generally available to the market and they know, or ought reasonably to know, that the information is material and not generally available to the market. 123 The rationale of this prohibition in typical financial markets is that insider trading undermines market efficiency because investors will feel at a distinct disadvantage if they believe insiders can exploit inside information, and hence won't invest. 124 The same rationale is far weaker in prediction markets where information about underlyings in the public interest will generally be disclosed to the market by the media. The mischief that insider trading regulations seek to prevent can thus be overcome by creating derivatives with underlyings which don't give insiders a substantial advantage. 125 Even where relevant information is not in the public domain, insider trading regulations are antithetical to the forecasting capability of the market; the accuracy of which relies, in part, on insiders trading on all the information they hold.
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Market manipulation regulations prohibit conduct that creates a false impression of trading activity, price movement, or market information. 127 This is also a concern in prediction markets where an accurate price signal is essential to its forecasting capability.
In practice, however, attempts at market manipulation have been consistently unsuccessful because well-informed traders can easily profit from manipulative trades due to the low purchase price of the derivatives. Market manipulation in prediction markets therefore tends to increase market liquidity rather than undermine it.
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Most importantly, insider trading and market manipulation regulations entail criminal liability that would be wholly disproportionate to the harm of the activity in prediction 
V RECOMMENDATIONS (i) Designation
Pursuant to the discussion in Part IV Subpart D, this paper recommends that the FMA makes a declaration that all the contracts traded on iPredict are derivatives.
(ii) Market Services Provider: Prescribed Intermediary Service
The FMC Act creates new 'prescribed intermediary service' licenses which provide the template for a more coherent approach to the regulation of prediction markets. These licenses were introduced to promote innovative developments in online fundraising: equity crowd-funding and peer-to-peer (P2P) lending. 131 Equity crowd-funding is a service that facilitates offers of shares by matching companies who wish to raise funds from many investors who are seeking to invest relatively small amounts. P2P lending is a service that facilitates small loans by matching borrowers to one or more lenders.
132
While the capital-raising purposes of the current prescribed intermediaries are clearly unlike the forecasting purpose of iPredict, the regulation that accompanies licensing is strikingly similar to how iPredict has been regulated to date.
Creation of special licences for equity crowd-funding and P2P lending platforms is intended to encourage small-scale funding of start-up companies by minimising 135 The disclosure must be given to retail investors before they enter into a client agreement with the intermediary; 136 an agreement which largely replicates the contents of the disclosure statement. 137 Under iPredict's current authorisation, iPredict enters into "participation agreements" with traders, and the terms and conditions of participation agreements are very similar to the prescribed contents of disclosure and intermediary client agreements.
138
The eligibility criteria for intermediary service licences also closely corresponds to iPredict's current regulation. Intermediaries must have systems to ensure that issuers do not raise more than $2 million per year via the intermediary. 139 This "investment cap"
reflects the FMA's approach to regulation of iPredict under the SM Act, whereby traders are subject to contribution limits of $2,500 in a period of 6 months and a cumulative total limit of $10,000. 140 Intermediary services must be fair, orderly and transparent neutral brokers between issuers and investors, in that the service is designed primarily for offers by persons other than the provider and the service must not give investment advice. 141 Equally, iPredict acts as a neutral broker between traders and does not offer advice about the profitability of its contracts. These similarities indicate that the regulations enacted for crowd-funding and P2P
lending can be largely transposed onto prediction markets. Accordingly, this paper recommends that regulations are passed to include prediction markets as a third prescribed intermediary service under the FMC Act. Eligibility criteria will, of course, not pertain to issuers but prediction markets should have comparable fair, orderly, and transparent systems and procedures:
 To ensure retail traders receive a timely and understandable service disclosure statement to assist traders to decide whether to acquire the derivatives:  To ensure retail traders enter into a client agreement with the service provider before they acquire the derivatives:  To ensure traders do not exceed the contribution limit (to be decided by the FMA) for the credit of his or her account with the clearing house:  To identify and manage the risk of fraud by traders, for example, in the event that a trader opens more than one trading account.
The FMA may also impose conditions on a licence. This paper recommends conditions that limit prediction market intermediaries to facilitating trades of derivatives with underlyings in which there is legitimate public interest. As to additional conditions, P2P lending and equity crowd-funding is relatively new territory and Government has opted for a flexible approach subject to careful supervision by the FMA. 147 This paper recommends that the same approach is taken to the regulation of prediction markets as a platform also in its early stage of development.
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VI CONCLUSION
Prediction market derivatives provide financial incentives for truthful revelation and information discovery, and an algorithm for aggregating diverse opinions on the probability of an event. The experience of iPredict to date has shown that these features collaborate to generate forecasts on issues of public concern which are frequently more accurate than conventional forecasting tools. iPredict's market prices therefore have a great deal of potential to inform public and private decision-making, but whether this potential can be realised under the FMC Act is unclear. This is not surprising: prediction market derivatives are not clearly securities. Nor do the markets sit neatly within gambling legislation where they would otherwise fall to be regulated and, in that case, prohibited. Accordingly, this paper proposed to find a place in securities law for these innovative markets.
Regulation of iPredict under the FMC Act is possible but the hurdles are not insignificant.
iPredict would rely on a declaration by the FMA that its contracts are derivatives and substantial exemptions from regulation compliance under the existing regulatory categories of derivatives issuer and financial product market. Such exemptions, while desirable, would render regulation relatively artificial in its application to iPredict.
This paper recommends a more coherent approach to the regulation of prediction markets by drawing from the regulation of other intermediaries that harness the power of online crowds. Crowd-funding and P2P lending platforms are similar to iPredict in many respects -neutral brokers between retail investors/traders for small amounts of funds through an online platform -and regulation of iPredict under the SM Act bears striking similarity to regulation under these new licenses. The existing prescribed intermediaries, however, have 147 Office of the Minister of Commerce, above n 82, at 16. 148 The requirement of a warning statement, however, is likely to be inappropriate considering the low value of the derivative contracts.
the distinct advantage of sitting within the Government's current Business Growth Agenda. 149 Until prediction markets attract the same legislative attention, it seems probable the markets will persist in legal limbo. 
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